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When asked about the old music movement and its search for original or historical 
performance, Simon Rattle, the conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic orchestra, 
answered that he has been influenced by this trend, as many musicians have been, 
and consequently cannot easily listen to older Mozart recordings – these are like 
speaking without grammar. The main point of the old music approach is not to 
use historical instruments but to figure out what is meant by musical notations, not 
being satisfied with what they seem to mean. The original meaning is not something 
one can easily reconstruct; however, one should get rid of received conformism by 
thinking about what it could be – this may help one to find the richness of musical 
language.1 Commenting on his conducting of Wagner’s Parsifal, Rattle said that 
doing this after having conducted some works by Debussy he heard new things in 
Wagner. While something later than Wagner was relevant to understanding him, 
Rattle added that Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde made sense through Schubert, being 
like Schubert with anabolic steroids. Now, my subject is not historical semantics in 
music, but it is of some interest that European classical music is associated with 
interpretative issues similar to those of interpreting historical texts.
What is Historical Semantics?
Linguistic historical semantics studies the change in the meanings of words and 
expressions through time.2 While etymological studies were popular in ancient 
times, as they are in modern discussions of the history of languages, linguistic 
historical semantics is also interested in various general aspects of diachronic 
variation, whether physiological, social or cognitive. A physiological explanation is 
offered in some studies on how adjectives related to certain sensory impressions 
are transferred from their earlier uses to other contexts. It is argued that touch 
1 Zeit 22 August 2002.
2 For historical semantics in linguistics, see Blank and Koch 1999.
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words may metaphorically transfer to tastes (sharp taste), colours (dull colour) 
or sounds (soft sounds), but not often to sights or smells. Flavour words do not 
transfer back to touch words, but do transfer to smells (sour smell) and sounds 
(sweet music) and so on. Aristotle deals with some analogous questions in his 
De sensu et sensibilibus, chapter 5, offering physical explanations which are not 
those of contemporary research. Cognitive constraints are dealt with in a study 
on modal words which argues that agent-oriented modalities, such as ability or 
permission, move into epistemic modalities and not vice versa. For example, 
‘must’ was first used to express obligation and received its epistemic meaning 
only in seventeenth-century English.3
Let us turn to historical semantics in philosophy. The study of the history of 
philosophy may be philological, sociological, doxographic or philosophical. By 
studies other than philosophical, I mean preparing text editions, philological 
investigations of philosophical texts, studies from the point of view of the sociology 
of knowledge, discussions of chronology, classificatory descriptions of the 
doctrines, and so on. These approaches may involve the historical semantics of 
philosophical terminology in the sense of linguistic historical semantics. Typical 
examples include the investigations of how non-philosophical terms have received 
technical philosophical meanings or, as for the history of Western philosophy, 
how Greek terms are translated into Latin or Arabic or Hebrew and how Arabic 
terms are translated into Latin and these into European languages, and how 
these complicated translation procedures affect the meanings of the terms. These 
approaches do not necessary involve philosophical interest in content. 
Doxographic studies deal with the content of the works, but the authors are not 
necessarily philosophers, just as the historians of medicine or physics are often 
humanists. However, there is also a form of historical semantics which is associated 
with philosophical studies of the history of philosophy. These differ from merely 
doxographic studies by combining philosophical and historical reconstruction. 
Philosophical historical semantics not merely investigates the various uses of 
terms but tries to understand the philosophical reasons for these variations as well 
as their systematic significance. 
One may wonder whether philosophical historical semantics is a history of 
concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) rather than a history of terms. In the history of 
philosophy, these are not far from each other, partly because philosophy itself has 
always been interested in explicating and analysing the meaning of terms, an early 
example being Aristotle’s philosophical dictionary in book V of the Metaphysics. I 
think that a philosophical concept is roughly the intended content of a theoretical 
3 For the controversial modal example, see Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 1994; for the sensory 
words, see Williams 1976.
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term. One of the differences between the studies of concepts and terms is that 
the terms may have many uses, as Aristotle often stresses, but this does not 
mean that concepts are non-historical entities separate from thinking minds. The 
intended meanings of terms which are not explicated may be constructed from the 
ways of using them, although not always easily, to be sure. Terms are discussed 
in studies of concepts, as is seen in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
a representative of German Begriffsgeschichte, and concepts and theories are 
studied in philosophically oriented studies of terms, as in the publications of the 
series Lessico Intellectuale Europeo.
The Enlightenment Model of Interpretation
In the history of ancient aesthetics, some writers have used the ‘pathetic fallacy’ as 
an explanatory category. This is exemplified by Theocritus’ saying that wild animals 
mourned at Daph nis’ death, by paintings which show trees or mountains expressing 
the emotional gestures of people and so on. Poets and artists fallaciously attributed 
human sentiments to animals and other things of nature (see Fowler 1989, 104-
9). In historical explanations of this kind it is assumed  that the poets and other 
artists mistakenly extrapolated from human emo tional ex periences to similar states 
in other beings. To speak about fallacies in texts of this kind is in line with the 
Enlighten ment concep tion of intellectual history, in which historical docu ments are 
seen as expres sions of the lower stages of the develop ment of human cognitive 
capaci ties. We may learn from them how insuf fi cient conceptual tools and mistaken 
beliefs influen ced habits of thinking and how certain questions puzzled people 
before the progress of rational thinking produced adequate solutions.
The Enlightenment model is often applied by the historians of science and is 
quite familiar among the historians of philosophy. Its ad herents are not merely 
critical. They may be im pressed by some his torical achie vements which in their 
opinion anticipated the more advan c ed contemporary views. Sometimes they pick 
up the valu able parts of the classics and rewrite them ‘in modern language’ . It is 
assum ed that we can easily see what is important and what is rubbish in historical 
texts. Bertrand Rus sell’s A History of Western Philosophy is an example of this 
approach, the usual criticism of which is that historical texts are read and evaluated 
as if they were answers to the philosophical ques tions which the inter preters happen 
to have in mind. This is seldom the case.  The meaning and significance of a text 
in its historical context may have been very different from the impression it makes 
on a reader of our times.  The purely ration al reconstruction is said to dismiss the 
basic interpretative task which is his torical reconst ruction without anachro nism. 
Let us consider anachronism for a while, since it is one of the key methodological 
issues in the history of philosophy and historical semantics in philosophy (Knuuttila 
2006, 93-95).
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Reconsidering Anachronism 
An often-quoted principle pertain ing to this topic, formulated by Quentin Skinner in 
1969, is that one should not maintain that a historical person said or did someth ing 
that he or she would not accept as a correct descripti on of what he or she meant or 
intended. Serious studies of the works of past masters should recon struct them as 
answers to ques tions that were actual or possible  in their histo rical contexts. The 
his toric al meaning is understood by considering the texts in relation to the intellec-
tual or social institu tions of their time.4
This view is defended in a slightly modified form by Richard Rorty, Alas dair 
MacIn tyre, Quentin Skinner and some others in a collection of essays which 
was published in 1984 under the title Philosophy in History. Rorty’s contribution 
deals with the reconstruction of historical meanings and the evaluation of their 
significance. He refers to hermeneutic philo sophy as a model for explaining these 
activities, but does not comment on questioning the division between merely his-
torical interpretation and systematic inter pretation in Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
philosophy. Gadamer does not maintain that the distinction just mentioned  is 
useless. His point is that these approaches are not independent of each other 
but are dialectically related. What is called an objective historical study of the 
original meaning is in fact always condi tioned by the  interpretative situation. Since 
all studies of historical texts are interplays between inter pretative presuppositions 
and texts, it is better to be conscious of this fact and not to pretend that histo rical 
meanings as such are revealed. According to Gadamer, avoiding anachronism can 
be characterized as an attempt to re frain from reading our ideas into texts. The 
purpose of reconstructing the historical horizon of philosophical texts is  to make 
room for ideas different from ours. We succeed better in this attempt the more 
conscious we are of our own modes of thinking. Instead of two separate levels of 
interpretation, it is more proper to speak about different moments of one process of 
interpreting and understanding (Gadamer 1965, 250-5, 342-4, 366, 374-5).  
This has something to do with the question of whether systematic philosophy and 
the history of philosophy belong together or should live separate lives. The authors 
who reject the sharp division between philosophy and its history as disciplines 
are often sympathetic to the dialectical conception of the levels of interpretation, 
although not necessarily in Gadamer’s sense. Those who separate philosophy 
and its history don’t see why systematic philosophy should be interested in history 
(see Kusch 1995, 17-23; Peckhaus 2000). It is understandable that the former 
group regards philosophy, whether past or present, as a historical and temporal 
institution, while the latter separates the historical dimension from the intellectual 
core. There is, however, no reason to believe that contemporary philosophy is 
4 Skinner 1969, 28; reprinted in Tully (ed. 1988), 48. 
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historically less contingent than past philosophy; the false opposite belief is best 
avoided by the inclusive conception of philosophy and its history.
Revising the Simple Anachronism Rule
Authors who believe in some sort of incommen surability between different cultures 
and traditions are incli ned to think that non-anachronistic historical reconstructions 
of past meanings should be under stood as partial descriptions of alien forms of 
thinking and that this reconstruction takes place through learning an entirely new 
conceptual system from the inside.5 I think that this is methodologically inconsistent, 
since speaking  about alien mean ings presupposes some sort of systematic 
comparison. I am more sympathetic to Gadamer’s view that the distinction 
between non-anachronistic and anachronistic interpretation does not overlap with 
the distinction between purely historical and purely philosophical interpretation of 
a historical text. This can be straightforwardly seen by looking at how the concepts 
and terms are studied in the history of philosophy. A simple example is to consider 
philosophical terms, such as ‘intu ition’, ‘irony’, ‘sympathy’ or ‘experiment’ in early 
modern English works. It is obvious that in many cases these terms are not used 
in the same way as they are used nowadays, but it is also true that noticing this 
implies comparison with contem porary usage. The difference with res pect to the 
later use of the words was beyond the purview of those authors, of cour se, but it 
is an essential part of the philosophically informed conception of how the terms 
were used by early modern authors. To mention an older example, ‘intentio’ in the 
influential Latin translation of Avicenna’s psychology is a property of the object 
of an attitude, not something in the mind of the subject. Not realizing this has 
devastating effects in the history of intentionality. This difference should certainly 
be mentioned when speaking about Avicenna’s conception of intention, although it 
was not mentioned by Avicenna himself. 
These examples show that in identifying historical philosophical views it is legi-
timate and even impera tive to pay attention to what is and what is not found in 
historical texts. If it is simply thought that anachronism is best avoided by not relating 
historical texts to what is historically later, the results may be absurd. How can we 
study Plato’s philosophy of love, for example, without having any philosophical 
ideas of love? One could similarly ask about Aristotle’s concept of induction, 
Chrysippus’ concept of emotion, Abelard’s concept of identity, Descartes’s concept 
of the mind and so on. 
Let us think about this dynamics of the historical studies of concepts by means 
of an extremely simplified example. Investigations of Plato’s concept of love are 
5 A classical source of this approach is Winch 1958; see also Winch 1964. 
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initiated by a more or less conscious preli mi nary conception of love which the 
authors use to read the texts in which Plato uses terms rendered by ‘love’. Suppose 
that the initial model includes the elements A, B, and C, one of these perhaps the 
so-called Platonic love of the belles-lettres. It may be seen that while A and B occur 
in Plato in these contexts, he does not dis cuss C at all. Instead he combines A and 
B with D, which does not occur in our initial model. This is how the kernel of the 
historical concept of Plato’s notion of love could be formed. In spite of reference 
to what is not found in Plato, it is not anachronistically maintained that there is 
something in Plato’s works which they do not involve. It is possible, of course, 
that historical concepts do not have any elements in common with established 
contemporary views, but translation and understanding presuppose that there is 
some common ground. 
Stating that some later ways of thinking are not used in a historical text involves 
no serious anachronism problems; on the contrary, this may be important in avoiding 
anachronism. When it is realized, for example, that Aristotle did not operate with 
the distinction between logical and physical necessities and possibilities in the way 
philosophers have done since late medieval times, this helps us to understand 
some of his arguments better and to avoid anachronistic misconstructions based 
on what we regard as a natural way of thinking. Similarly, in discussing the concept 
of tolerance in Locke or Tindal, it is informative to mention that it did not include 
freedom from religion and, more generally, when there are similarities between 
historical texts and contemporary ideas, it is worth considering which elements of 
the later views may be included in earlier work and which are not.6 Even when there 
are similar elements, the talk about historical development additionally demands a 
genetic connection. 
On the basis of these modest remarks, I suggest that avoiding anachronism in 
historical semantics in philosophy should not exclude negative references to later 
ideas. It is enough to keep to the common sense idea that one should not maintain 
that a historical author says something which he or she does not say. Relating a 
historical text to various philosophical ideas and stating what is not found in it is 
not anachronistic and can be of considerable interpretative help. Even though I 
mentioned Gadamer’s view of the history of philosophy with a certain sympathy, 
the position I have argued for is closer to that of Skinner than of Gadamer, even 
though it goes beyond Skinner’s original position. I think that the hermeneutical 
idea of serious philosophical interpretation as a circle in which the horizons of the 
text and the interpreter are fused in a new understanding of the subject cannot 
6 Prima facie similar views can have quite different meanings depending on how they are influenced 
by general presuppositions and related to surrounding. This is the main point in Hintikka’s criticism of 
the unit ideas in A.O. Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being; see Hintikka 1976. 
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be the basic model for historical studies.7 The majority of historical texts are not 
uplifting in this manner. This is not problematic if the philosophical interest is 
taken to be directed to the plurality of alternative approaches in understanding 
things and developing analytical tools in history as well as to the light shed by the 
past thought on the contingencies of the interpreters’ cognitive culture. Seeing 
the historical views clearly has primacy over commenting on them in the history 
of philosophy. Avoiding anachronism in the way described above makes this 
approach philosophical even without evaluation. 
Philosophical Translation
Anachronistic translations of historical philosophical texts are easily recognized 
through their non-traditional technical vocabulary. In Western philosophy, these 
problems are more usual in translated quotations from Greek or Latin works than in 
the translations of the whole works. Some people try to avoid anachronism by not 
using technical philosophical terms at all, for example, the terms derived from late 
ancient or medieval Latin translations in translating Greek texts, but the results are 
curious rather than useful. People may want to take a look at a translation of Aristotle’s 
Categories in order to check how the categories of substance, quantity or quality 
are described – it is frustrating if the words are not found in the translation. Good 
translations make use of traditional philosophical terms, if available, assuming that 
readers know that Western philosophical terminology is associated with historical 
layers and that the words signifying concepts have a history and the concepts 
signified by words are not unchanging. This is part of the life in historical traditions. 
As long as there is an understandable historical link between the contemporary 
uses of philosophical terms and their traditional uses, as for example the category 
terms, the names of many mental faculties and other Latin-based words, these terms 
can mostly be used in translations without great difficulty, although explanatory 
notes are sometimes useful. If there are no such historical connections, it may be 
better to avoid contemporary systematic terminology because of its anachronistic 
connotations. Various potential connotations of this kind are of course involved 
even in pretty standard traditional translations and may mislead quick readers.
Philosophical translations are facilitated by the concept-seeking nature of 
philosophical texts. Sometimes a translator must consider whether a term is 
used as a technical term for one concept or whether it is used in many ways 
in a historical text. In the first case, all occurrences should be translated in the 
same way if historical accuracy is intended, even if the result may not be very 
elegant. It is possible that there is no good contemporary equivalent term, but 
7 Cf. Gadamer 1965, 284-290. For understanding without any kind of acceptance of shared beliefs, 
see also Brandom 2000. 
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the problem is often exaggerated. Skinner writes that since Machiavelli uses the 
words ‘virtù’ and ‘virtuosi’ in a traditional Christian sense as well as of talented but 
vicious men, commentators have generally come to the conclusion that ‘virtù’ has 
no determinate meaning at all. Skinner remarks that if there is no equivalent term 
in English, it does not mean that there is some confusion in the texts. To suppose 
otherwise is a genuinely ‘whig’ fallacy (Skinner 1988, 252-3). While agreeing with 
this, I wonder whether this particular translation is a big problem – people reading 
Aristotle’s ethics are habituated to reading about the virtues of good human beings, 
good horses, good knives, and so on. Why not here? 
Sometimes a less influential historical concept does not correspond very well 
to customary terminology and is systematically important in the text. These cases 
are similar to those in translating philosophical works from other cultural traditions 
into European languages. If the original technical term is a concrete word which 
has received a philosophical meaning, translators usually translate this word as 
such and the reader is supposed to see the meaning from the use. This is not 
very problematic and can be explained in notes. It is more cumbersome if there 
is no good corresponding word for the concrete term. According to Skinner’s non-
philosophical example, there is no equivalent English word for the Latin ‘imber’, 
although one can understand how it is used (ibid. 251-2). Things are further 
complicated if such a problematic concrete term is meant to be applied to a 
philosophical concept. These cases are not very usual. 
The questions associated with translating philosophical texts are partly the 
same as those of historical philosophical semantics. Similar considerations are 
needed in translating texts and in conceptual research on them, the difference 
being that translations should not be reports of these considerations. Because 
of the similarity of the background work, translators of old philosophical works 
are tempted to include explanations in the text. Inasmuch as the purpose is to 
make a text accessible in a relatively anachronistic manner, this is not welcome. 
Translation and commentary are, after all, two different things – this is the difficult 
but fascinating problem of philosophical translation.8 
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